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RESEARCH ARTICLE
Inequality of access in irrigation systems of the
mid-hills of Nepal
Bishnu Pariyara, Jon C. Lovettb and Carolyn Snellc
ABSTRACT
Access to, and control over, water for irrigation is one of the most important factors for increasing
agricultural productivity, thereby affecting household food security and levels of poverty in developing
countries. However, investments in the irrigation sector have often failed to consider equity aspects of
irrigation interventions. Using data from 199 households from three irrigation systems in the mid-hills of
Nepal, we analyse access and control of water in different levels of socio-economic heterogeneities. The
results demonstrate that efforts to improve livelihoods of the rural poor should give due consideration to
the distributional aspects of irrigation interventions, with authority for allocating the level of access to
irrigation water given to the farmers throughout the system.
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摘要
尼泊尔中部山地灌溉系统使用权的不平等性. Area Development and Policy. 能够使用和控制灌溉用水是提
高农业生产率最重要的因素之一，从而对发展中国家的家庭粮食安全和贫困水平有影响作用。然而，对
灌溉行业的投资往往忽视了灌溉干预的公平性。基于尼泊尔中部山地三大灌溉系统 199 户家庭的数据，
本研究对不同社会经济异质性水平上水的使用权和控制权进行了分析。结果显示，改善农村贫困人口的
生活水平应充分考虑灌溉干预的分配因素，将分配灌溉用水使用权水平的权力交到整个系统中的农民手
里
关键词
空间不均衡性, 社会经济异质性, 水的使用权, 灌溉, 贫困, 尼泊尔
RESUMEN
Desigualdad del acceso a los sistemas de irrigación en las colinas medias de Nepal. Area Development and
Policy. El control y el acceso al agua de irrigación es uno de los factores más importantes para aumentar la
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productividad agrícola, afectando a la seguridad alimentaria de los hogares y los niveles de pobreza en los
países en desarrollo. Sin embargo, muchas veces las inversiones en el sector de la irrigación no han sabido
considerar los aspectos de equidad en los programas de irrigación. A partir de datos de 199 hogares de tres
sistemas de irrigación en las colinas medias de Nepal, analizamos el acceso y el control del agua en
diferentes niveles de heterogeneidades socioeconómicas. Los resultados demuestran que en los esfuerzos
por mejorar los medios de vida de zonas rurales pobres deberán tenerse en cuenta los aspectos distribu-
tivos de los programas de irrigación con autoridad para asignar qué nivel de acceso al agua de irrigación se
proporciona a los agricultores en todo el sistema.
PALABRAS CLAVE
Desigualdad espacial, heterogeneidad socioeconómica, acceso al agua, irrigación, pobreza, Nepal
АННОТАЦИЯ
Неравенство доступа к ирригационным системам Мид-Хилс Непала. Area Development and Policy.
Доступ к воде для орошения и контроль над ней являются одним из важнейших факторов
повышения производительности сельского хозяйства, которые влияют на продовольственную
безопасность домашних хозяйств и уровень бедности в развивающихся странах. Однако
инвестиции в ирригационный сектор часто не учитывали аспект справедливости подобных
вмешательств. Используя данные 199 домашних хозяйств из трех ирригационных систем Мид-
Хилс Непала, мы анализируем доступ и контроль над водой на различных уровнях социально-
экономической гетерогенности. Результаты показывают, что усилия по улучшению
жизнедеятельности сельской бедноты должны учитывать распределительные аспекты
ирригационных вмешательств, с предоставлением полномочий по назначению уровня доступа
к ирригационной воде во всей системе фермера
КЛЮЧЕВЫЕ СЛОВА
Пространственное неравенство, социально-экономическая неоднородность, доступность воды,
орошение, бедность, Непал
INTRODUCTION
Once they have arisen, social inequalities can be very persistent, even if the law guarantees
equality irrespective of characteristics such as gender or cultural heritage. Structural spatial
inequalities are particularly difficult to address because once people are physically positioned
with respect to access to natural, social or economic resources, then tenure laws protect their
location (Kanpur & Venables, 2005; Kanpur & Zhang, 2005). Three lines of argument are
prominent in the literature on the causes of spatial inequalities. First, a ‘structures’ perspective
argues that spatial inequalities can be attributed to the structural factors such as ethnicity
(Anderson & Pomfret, 2003), institutional diversity (Davies & Hammack, 2005), lack of
credit markets (Galor & Zeira, 1993), variations in household borrowing and repayment
capacity (Hare & West, 1999), social networking (Munshi & Rosenzweig, 2005) and access
to natural resources (Shackleton & Shackleton, 2006). Second, ‘status-quoism’ attributes
spatial inequality to initial conditions such as initial regional endowment (Alesina & Rodrik,
1994), income distribution (Chakravorty, 2003), land distribution (Knight & Song, 1993) and
other asset holdings (Fujita, Krugman, & Venables, 1999). Third, ‘economic opportunism’
maintains that spatial inequalities arise as a consequence of the presence or absence of the
economic opportunity that space provides (Banerji & Jain, 2003). The proponents of this
argument suggest that spatial inequality can be attributed to market thickness, as areas with
greater market opportunities attract investment, settlement and consumption (Fujita, 2008;
Liu, Dunford, Song, & Chen, 2016). They argue that economic space matters in determining
the magnitude of spatial inequalities (Nel & Rogerson, 2009).
2 Bishnu Pariyar et al.
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Access to and control over natural resources such as irrigation water is a common and
interesting example of spatial inequality. Irrigation is often considered critical for farmer
livelihoods, especially in developing countries (Hussain, 2007; Jodha, 1990). Policy interven-
tions to ensure farmers’ access to natural resources, whilst partially successful (Campbell et al.,
2001), continue to face challenges. A growing body of theoretical and empirical literature
argues that the existence of heterogeneities (socio-economic, cultural, spatial, interests, power
relations etc.) contribute towards the non-realization of the full potential of policy interven-
tions in both developing and developed countries (Bardhan & Dayton-Johnson, 2002; Vedeld,
2000). In many developing countries the distribution of irrigation water is based on land
ownership, which makes irrigation development inherently biased against the landless and
land poor. Case studies from India found that both inter-farm and interregional inequalities
widened in almost one-third of the irrigation systems (Freebairn, 1995). Economic factors,
such as access to market, provide obvious advantages to owners of large tracts of land; social
factors, such as caste, influence the level of benefits obtained by farmers. For example, in India
there were significant differences in the benefits accruing to households from higher social
strata as compared with those from lower caste affiliations (Banik et al., 2003). Consequently,
measures of sustainable resource use must also include success in promoting social goals such
as equitable distribution of benefits and social security (Bardhan, 2000; Smith, 2004).
Differences imposed on farmers’ abilities to extract benefits from irrigation resources are
likely to give rise to recurrent distributional conflicts and create factionalism (Fresson, 1979;
Johnson & Libecap, 1982). Head to tail (upstream–downstream) inequity in irrigation systems
has been well documented (Hussain & Hanjra, 2004). For example, farmers at the tail end of
irrigation canals have high transaction costs for negotiating water access due to spatial
disadvantages in deriving benefits from the canal system. A systematic difference in the level
of incentives for engaging in collective action was observed between head- and tail-end
farmers (Bardhan & Dayton-Johnson, 2002; Meinzen-Dick, Raju, & Gulati, 2002). These
differences often translate into differences in land values: land with easy access to irrigation has
a higher value than that with limited accessibility to irrigation, thereby reinforcing existing
wealth inequalities (Chakravorty, 2016; Ostrom, 1990).
The significant body of literature on the performance of irrigation systems (Oad &
Sampath, 1995; Renault & Vehmeyer, 1999) is mostly technical in nature without the
consideration of farmers’ perspectives. Previous studies in Nepal have mostly focused on
comparative analysis of irrigation systems governed by different property management
regimes and associated institutional arrangements (Shivakoti, 1991; Lam, 1996, 1998;
Maskey, Weber, & Loof, 1994; Hill, Pant, & Thapa, 2008; Regmi, 2007; Pradhan,
1989). From a management perspective, Nepalese irrigation systems can be broadly
divided into three categories: government-managed irrigation systems (AMISs);
farmer-managed irrigation systems (FMISs); and jointly managed irrigation systems
(JMISs). The devolution of irrigation systems and resultant co-management structure
is the product of a policy shift in the early 1990s when there was a gradual retrenchment
of government involvement in the construction, maintenance and operation of irrigation
systems, with increasing irrigation management roles for users (Department of Irrigation
(DoI), 1992).
Some previous studies on the performance of irrigation systems considered the per-
spectives of irrigation managers, but did not fully represent the perspectives of the farmers
who use the irrigation resources (Bottrall, 1981; Lethem & Ng, 1983; Levine & Coward,
1986). This study explores the distributional implications of irrigation development at the
household level using users’ perspectives. Farmers are organized through water user’s
associations (WUAs) for managing irrigation systems in many developing countries.
First, the paper investigates spatial inequalities in irrigation water distribution across
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different landholdings within the canal command area. Second, variables associated with
socio-economic heterogeneities and their influences on farmer access to irrigation water are
identified.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section discusses the research methodology
including study sites, data collection and modelling techniques. The third and fourth sections
present the findings of the distributive aspects of irrigation development through both
descriptive statistics and logistic regression. Conclusions are drawn and policy recommenda-
tions are made in the fifth section.
RESEARCH METHODS: STUDY SITE AND DATA COLLECTION
Study site
The criteria used for selecting case study sites included different management regimes, rural
settings in the mid-hills region with comparable climate (rainfall and temperature), similarity in
cropping pattern, and the existence of socially heterogeneous communities. The southward
sloping mid-hills comprise almost 70% of the total land area in Nepal, sandwiched between the
low laying Gangetic plains (terai) in the south and high Himalayan mountains in the north
(Figure 1). Rainfall varies with season, with winter and spring being drier than the monsoon,
when 80% of the rain falls. Agriculture in the mid-hills is primarily subsistence farming with
cultivation on terraced landscapes. Elevation in the mid-hills ranges from 70 masl in the river
valleys to more than 3000 masl in the mountains (HMGN/MPFS, 1988). High topographic
variation makes the construction and maintenance of irrigation systems difficult. In conse-
quence, irrigation systems are mostly medium to small scale, and are maintained by local farmers
who require irrigation water for crop cultivation. In Nepal, irrigation systems are classified based
on the command area (the area irrigated) they serve: < 500 ha (small irrigation systems); > 500 <
2000 ha (medium irrigation systems); and > 2000 ha (large irrigation systems).
The research was undertaken in three districts, Lamjung, Kaski and Parbat in the mid-hills
region of Western Nepal, where the Rainastar, Phalebas and Begnas irrigation systems are
located respectively. The Begnas irrigation system represents an AMIS, designed and con-
structed on the basis of engineering and agronomy, with consideration to cropping patterns,
irrigation efficiency and effective rainfall (Pradhan, 2005). They are primarily funded and
maintained by the government of Nepal through its auxiliary body, the Department of
Irrigation (DoI). The Phalebas irrigation system is an example of an FMIS, initiated, con-
structed and maintained by communal efforts. The Rainastar irrigation system represents the
JMIS, and was constructed and managed by the government through the DoI in the first stage
of development, and transferred to local communities after communal capacity building.
Irrigation systems under JMIS management regimes are co-managed systems with technical
inputs from government, while responsibilities for operation and maintenance (O&M) activ-
ities and lower-level decision-making is transferred to the beneficiary farmers.
The characteristics of each irrigation system investigated are presented in Table 1. The
Phalebas irrigation system has a relatively small command area, while both the Begnas and the
Rainastar irrigation systems are medium scale. The Begnas system is managed by government
through the DoI, while the Rainastar system is jointly managed by government and local
farmers.
Data collection
Data were gathered using a household survey, focus group discussions and key-informant
interviews. In addition to questions about the current irrigation system situation, respondents
were also asked about their long-term concerns. Respondents were explicitly asked not to base
4 Bishnu Pariyar et al.
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their response on one sporadic event, but to take the overall performance of the irrigation
system into account while answering questions.
In order to capture spatial and caste/ethnic hierarchy, households were randomly selected
on a proportional basis from different locations, landholdings and castes from each ward of the
village development committee (VDC) served by the irrigation canals. All the sample house-
holds held private landholdings. There were no leasehold lands in the research sites, but share
cropping was a common practice amongst the farmers. The amount and type of private land
reflects the economic and socio-political status of the households. Households had access to
two types of land called khet and pakho. Khet is irrigated lowland, whilst pakho is upland,
Figure 1. Study sites in Nepal.
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usually but not always non-irrigated. It is common for households in rural villages to under-
take some farming activities outside the canal command area. For example, households reside
in hamlets in an elevated areas called gau (village) with some non-irrigated farming; and have
landholdings at lower elevations, which are more fertile and have access to water called besi
(farmland).
The Nepal Living Standard Survey categorizes landholding into three categories with
holdings < 0.5 ha classified as small landholdings, whilst holdings > 2 ha are large land-
holdings. Households with larger landholdings are respected, have greater authority and often
act in village judicial arbitration. Households were categorized into three landholding groups:
small, medium and large landholders (Richards, Kanel, Maharjan, & Davies, 1999) using a
participatory rural appraisal (PRA) process.
In this study, local farmers defined landholdings < 0.45 ha as ‘small’, while those with
landholdings between 0.45 and 0.96 ha were considered as ‘medium’ landholdings.
Farmers with landholdings > 0.96 ha were ‘large’ landholders. A total of 201 households
were selected using a stratified random sampling procedure. The survey was administered
to household heads. Whilst the authors are aware of the limitations of this questionnaire
method, this decision was made primarily because in rural Nepal the head of household
generally holds land disposal rights, controls the household’s income/expenditure and
makes decisions on the behalf of family members. The household heads also take part
in meetings and village-level discussions of public interest, and are more likely to be aware
of, and have knowledge about, irrigation issues. Most households are headed by men,
although some are headed by widows or women whose husbands have left in search of
employment in other countries. In the latter case, where the man is not present, women
carry out almost all the work customarily assigned to men. In the absence of the father and
mother, the households are headed by the eldest son in the family, and he performs all the
responsibilities usually performed by his parents. It is least likely that the households will
be headed by the eldest daughter. We expected that female-headed households to provide
insights into the equity of irrigation interventions. Jazairy, Alamgir, and Panuccio (1992)
Table 1. Characteristics of the three irrigation systems.
Irrigation
system
Water source and
system characteristics
Command
area (ha)
Year
built
Management
type
Water user’s
associations’
(WUAs)
duration
Phalebas
irrigation
system (PIS)
Fed by a local seasonal
stream. Mostly non-
cement-lined earthen
canal with a temporary
headwork
341 1931 Farmer-
managed
irrigation system
(FMIS)
3 years
Begnas
irrigation
system (BIS)
Fed by a lake. A modern
system with a
sophisticated
infrastructure; a cement-
lined and permanent
headwork
580 1988 Government-
managed
irrigation system
(AMIS)
3 years, but not
renewed
Rainstar
irrigation
system (RIS)
Fed by a perennial river.
Semi-modern with a
permanent headwork
850 1994 Jointly managed
irrigation system
(JMIS)
3 years
6 Bishnu Pariyar et al.
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maintain that female-headed households suffer a triple disadvantage: poverty, gender
discrimination and an absence of support in their role. Female-headed households are
characterized by lower average earnings, fewer assets, less access to remunerative occupa-
tions and productive resources such as land, capital and technology, low education and
restricted access to land and credit from banks and local cooperatives (Agarwal, 1994).
The model
Three aspects of access were considered when constructing a model of the system: reliability,
equity and adequacy. The variables for adequacy and reliability capture system characteristics
enabling the delivery of adequate and reliable water to the farmers. Equity represents institu-
tional mechanisms for water distribution. The importance of water to the farming households
varies over the agricultural year, so different weightings were given to responses in different
seasons. The weightings were derived by asking farmers to give marks out of 100 for their level
of dependency on the canal for irrigation during different cropping seasons. The average marks
given by the farmers were 15%, 35% and 50% for monsoon, winter and spring respectively.
The dichotomous (binary) responses for the three variables, i.e., reliability, adequacy and
equity, in all three cropping seasons (monsoon, winter and spring) were weighted and added
together to compute a continuous variable ranging from 0 to 3.
The quantitative data were derived from a relatively small sample so data were aggregated
to enable maximum analysis with minimum loss of information (Searle, 2005). The dependent
variable was divided into categories: households having strong access to water and those having
weak access, reflecting the farmers’ experience. The distribution of the weighted access score is
presented in Figure 2.
The next stage was to reduce the individual scores into manageable groups, bearing in
mind that the choice of boundaries in aggregated data is arbitrary (Bryman & Cramer, 1994,
p. 178) and that care needs to be taken when creating cut-off points for dichotomous
dependent variables (Searle, 2005). The dependent variable, level of access, was created by
dividing households into two categories: strong access (access score > 1.735) and weak access
(access score ≤ 1.734). This decision was informed by two considerations. First, the distribu-
tion of the weighted access score (Figure 2) is skewed on both sides of 1.73, indicating water
availability that is considered to be enough for cultivating two crops in a year. Second, the
majority of farmers say that if they have a good water supply throughout the year on all three
measures of access defined in this research, they are able to grow up to three crops a year,
whereas if they do not have good access to irrigation water, then they could only cultivate one
Figure 2. Distributions of access score in the sample.
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crop in a year. Furthermore, there was a common consensus amongst farmers that they should
have at least an average access score for them to grow two crops a year, which is critical for
household food security. Therefore, an overall mean access score was taken as the boundary for
the strong–weak division.
Logistic regression analysis was used to predict the probability of strong access to irrigation water
by farmers in households with different socio-economic characteristics. The analysis assumes that
access to irrigation water is a function of both socio-economic and physical characteristics of the
resource base. Definitions of the explanatory variables are presented in Table 2.
The following model was estimated:
XCESS ¼ β0 þ β1PHYCOND þ β2RULES þ β3TRUSTH þ β4TRUSTL þ β5CASTE
þ β6HHSEX þ β7LOCH þ β8LOCT þ β9AGROKN þ β10FARL þ β11FARS
þ β12NSGRAD þ β13WATFED þ β14SHAPEþ e
Table 2. Definition of explanatory variables.
Variables Explanations
Expected sign of the
relationship
RUGOVS Dummy for simplicity of irrigation-governing rules (1 = simple,
0 = otherwise)
+
LEVTRUH Dummy for a higher level of trust (1 = higher, 0 = otherwise) +
LEVTRUL Dummy for a lower level of trust (1 = lower, 0 = otherwise) –
CASTE Dummy for caste (1 = Dalits, 0 = otherwise) –
HHSEXD Dummy for gender (1 = male, 0 = otherwise) +
LOCMCH Dummy for landholding location at the head end of the canal
(1 = head end, 0 = otherwise)
+
LOCMCT Dummy for landholding location at the tail end of the canal
(1 = tail end, 0 = otherwise)
–
AGROKN Dummy for a farmer’s agricultural knowledge used as a proxy
for water user’s association (WUA) engagement in educating
farmers regarding water application (1 = knowing crop-water
requirement, 0 = otherwise)
+
PHYCOND Dummy for the physical condition of the canal (1 = cement
lined, 0 = non-cement lined)
+
FARTYPL Dummy for a large landholding (1 = large, 0 = otherwise) +
FARTYPS Dummy for a small landholding (1 = small, 0 = otherwise) –
NSCLYR Continuous variable measuring educational level (number of
years of schooling)
?
WATFED Dummy for the source feeding the irrigation system
(1 = perennial river, 0 = otherwise)
+
SHAPE Dummy for the shape of the canal (1 = elongated with multiple
outlets, 0 = otherwise)
–
GRAD Dummy for the gradient of the canal (1 = north–south
direction, 0 = east to west or west to east direction
–
8 Bishnu Pariyar et al.
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Tests using correlation and heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors (SEs) and White’s
SEs indicated that for multicollinearity (tolerance > 0.1), variance inflation factor (VIF) < 10)
was not a concern. In order to avoid variable omission bias, the ‘household number of school
years’ and ‘amount irrigable landholding’ (continuous variables) were introduced into the
model, after checking that they did not introduce unacceptable multicollinearity.
RESULTS AND OBSERVATIONS
Household sample
A total of 201 households were surveyed, with 199 valid responses used in the final analysis as
two questionnaires were discarded for being incomplete. A higher proportion of ‘small’ land-
holders (51.3%) compared with ‘medium’ landholders (23.1%) and ‘larger’ landholders (25.6%)
are characteristic of agriculture in the mid-hills of Nepal, where landholdings are small and
often fragmented. Livelihoods are agriculture-based and often only for subsistence cultivation.
Although some large landholdings exist, commercial farming is rarely practised; instead
farmers with large landholdings allow farmers with small holdings to cultivate their lands on
a crop sharing basis. Similarly, the higher proportion of non-Dalit higher castes (86.4%)
compared with Dalit castes (13.6%) in the sample (derived using proportional stratification)
was representative of the population (CBS, 2011). Historically, Dalits were ascribed a low
status within the Hindu caste system and remain one of the most economically marginalized,
politically excluded and socio-culturally oppressed communities in Nepal (Berreman, 1973;
Pariyar & Lovett, 2016).
As expected, a high proportion (78.4%) of households were headed by men. The remaining
21.6% households were headed by women. Generally, household members followed traditional
family roles with women undertaking household activities and men involved in non-household
activities including irrigation issues. The number of female-headed households, particularly
amongst the Dalit castes, is increasing as many men from the Dalit communities are away,
working as labourers in India and Middle Eastern countries (Gyawali, 2007). The majority
(51.8%) were in the middle section of the canal with 20.1% at the head and 28.1% at the tail
end, partly because the middle section is larger than the head and tail sections. Furthermore,
interview data suggest that households prefer to farm in the middle section of the canal mainly
because the water supply is good and the area is less likely to become water logged than the
head end of the canal.
Household endowment, labour allocation and resource use pattern
The socio-economic inequalities in terms of sample household costs and benefits of involve-
ment in irrigation management are presented in Table 3. Households in the large landholding
categories have higher amounts of better-quality productive khet land, which is more accessible
to irrigation facilities compared with their ‘small’ landholder counterparts.
A similarly skewed land distribution can be observed between male- and female-headed
households with the former having almost double the size of landholdings. In Dalit house-
holds, neither the male nor the female headed had double the size of the average landholdings
compared with the average landholdings for female-headed households. Statistically, the
average landholding of Dalit households (0.34 ha) was significantly less than that of female-
headed households from higher castes (0.38 ha). Although statistically not significant, there
was also a gender disparity in landholding within Dalit communities with male-headed Dalit
households having larger landholdings (0.39 ha) than female-headed households (0.3 ha).
It is also clear (Table 3) that there is a noticeably skewed distribution of types of land-
holdings among different caste groups with landholders from higher castes having access to
more productive khet (more than double) than Dalit households, whilst Dalit households have
Inequality of access in irrigation systems of the mid-hills of Nepal 9
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access to more unproductive and non-irrigable pakho lands. Overall, farmers from higher caste
groups had access to larger amounts of land (mean = 0.63, SE = 0.05, N = 172) compared with
farmers from lower castes (mean = 0.33, SE = 0.05, N = 27). This difference was significant [t
(71.527) = –4.22, p < 0.05], and, according to Cohen’s effect size value (d = 0.85), large.
Whilst the number of female-headed households have increased recently due to male out-
migration, out-migrants are mostly from Dalit caste groups who have left mainly due to
poverty, lack of land and employment opportunities.
Household labour allocation and the associated total transaction costs for irrigation
management are presented in Table 3. The larger, medium and small landholders respectively
contributed 3.6, 6.9 and 23.5 man-days labour per hectare of irrigable land in O&M activities
annually. These differences are statistically significant [F(2,196) = 39.903, p < 0.01], while
Cohen’s effect size (d = 0.29) is moderate. Similarly the average person-days spent annually in
WUA meetings by the large, medium and small landholders were 4.08, 3.02 and 2.24
respectively. The differences were statistically significant [F(2,196) = 5.251, p < 0.01], but
Cohen’s effect size (d = 0.05) was small. Small households contribute more labour per hectare
(person-day per year) but participate less in WUA meetings than their medium and larger
landholding counterparts (Table 3).
Table 3 also reveals that statistically female-headed households (mean = 19.02, SE = 3.17,
N = 43) spent significantly [t(197) = 1.956, p < 0.05] more time per hectare of irrigable land in
O&M activities compared with male-headed households (mean = 13.1, SE = 1.30, N = 156).
Cohen’s effect size (d = 0.3) was moderate. With respect to caste, Dalit households
(mean = 24.6, SE = 4.67, N = 27) contributed significantly [t(197) = 3.334, p < 0.05] more
man-days per unit of irrigable land for O&M activities than their non-Dalit counterparts
(mean = 12.85, SE = 1.19, N = 172). Cohen’s effect size (d = 0.56) was large.
Table 3 also presents the combined monetary costs of participating in O&M activities and
WUA meetings incurred by sample households. Farmers with small landholdings bear sub-
stantially higher costs per unit area of irrigation land as compared with their medium and
larger landholding counterparts. Male-headed households play a significant role in decision-
making processes through their higher level of participation in the WUA meetings, whilst
female-headed households contribute significantly to labour-intensive canal O&M activities.
However, female-headed Dalit households make a disproportionally larger contribution
towards these tasks relative to the amount of irrigated land they cultivate. Additionally, whilst
the contribution of female-headed households to irrigation-related decision-making is in
general lower, Dalit female-headed households made the smallest contribution, further iso-
lating Dalit female-headed households from this type of decision-making in rural Nepal.
Whilst Dalits, female-headed and tail-end farming households benefit least from irriga-
tion, significant disparities exist amongst them in terms of the costs incurred in the O&M of
canal infrastructure. A one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) indicated that these cost
differences were significant. Post-hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicate that
the costs incurred by Dalit households were significantly higher than those incurred by tail-
enders. However, the costs incurred by female-headed households did not significantly differ
from Dalits and tail-enders, due perhaps to the fact that many Dalit households cultivate
khoriya land, which is usually but not always located at the tail end of the canal. Taken
together, these results suggest that given the amount of irrigable land available for Dalits, they
contribute significantly more towards O&M of the canal infrastructure compared with higher
castes and head-enders.
The field observations indicated that the head-enders were more reluctant to pay the water
service fee, partly because they have an advantageous position in acquiring water from the
canal. Also, the larger landholding farmers may attempt to hide the amount of agricultural
land they hold in order to pay less. For example, some farmers still cultivate surveyed land
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allocated for residential purposes. Also, a significant proportion of head and tail-end farmers
are reported not to have paid water service charges. About 42.5% of head-enders did not pay
water service fees compared with 22.3% and 30.4% from middle and tail end respectively,
which is a significant difference.
Table 3 also presents seasonal and overall water appropriation patterns among the sampled
households. Although the difference in water appropriation is wealth sensitive, i.e., directly
proportional to the amount of irrigable land, the location dimension indicates a head-tail
inequality in water distribution. On average, the landholdings at the head end appropriate
almost four times more water than landholdings at the tail end of the canal systems.
DETERMINANTS OF HOUSEHOLD LEVEL OF ACCESS TO IRRIGATION
WATER
A multiple logistic regression model was estimated to predict the probability of strong access
to irrigation water by farmers in households with different socio-economic characteristics
(Table 4).
The model tested performs well with a Cox and Snell R2 = 0.382 and Nagelkerke
R2 = 0.516 and an acceptable significance level of 95%. The results indicate that the physical
condition of the canal had a statistically significant negative association with the odds of
having strong access to irrigation water. The odds of farmers served by cement-lined canals
having strong access to water are significantly less (1.7 times) than those served by non-
cement-lined canals. Other physical characteristics of the canals also have a significant
influence on household access to canal irrigation water. The odds of having strong access
increased by 0.28 times for canals running in an east–west direction compared with those
flowing in the north–south east–west direction. In Nepal, particularly in hilly areas, the canals
flowing in a north–south direction have steep gradients and flow through difficult terrain
compared with those flowing in the north–south east–west direction. These canals are gen-
erally long, elongated, prone to landslides and in need of frequent O&M for a smooth flow of
water. However, the canals that flow in an east–west direction have mild gradients and flow
through command areas which are flat river basins, making maintenance efforts lower and
relatively easy.
A high level of trust and simplicity of rules is positively associated with access to water, and
vice versa. The odds of having weak access to water increased 0.278 times for farmers
reporting a low level of trust compared with the other farmers. Farmers reporting that the
rules are simple and easy to understand were 1.55 times more likely to have strong access to
water than those who reported that they were complex and difficult to understand. A
perception of simplicity is of practical significance as some WUAs make significant invest-
ments in educating farmers about their rules making it easier for farmers to interpret and
follow them. Key informants reported limited or no such educational programmes for farmers
in the two of the irrigation systems considered in this study, with the result that farmers the
rule governing their irrigation systems complex and difficult to understand.
The model predicts that other socio-economic characteristics of households significantly
influence access to irrigation canal water. Strong access to irrigation decreased by 0.387-fold
for farmers at the tail end of the canal implying that tail-end farmers face locational disadvan-
tages, while farmers at the head had a spatial advantage for appropriating more water. Qualitative
interviews confirmed this result. Farmers at the head end of canal systems considered they should
have priority rights to irrigation water. Strong access to irrigation water was reduced 0.379-fold
for farmers with small landholdings compared with farmers with large landholdings. Key
informant interviewees repeatedly mentioned the dominance of the large farmers in the
12 Bishnu Pariyar et al.
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management of the irrigation system in the Begnas irrigation system and emphasized that the
irrigation systems lie at the heart of village-level politics, with irrigation issues used by the large
and powerful farmers for political gain rather than creating benefits for marginal farmers. The
odds of reporting strong access to water are significantly increased for large landholders. Farmers
with larger landholdings were 2.564 times more likely to report strong access to irrigation water
compared with farmers with small or medium landholdings. The nature of the water source also
influences access to irrigation water. Famers whose landholdings are served by irrigation canals
with a perennial river source are 3.804 times more likely to report strong access to irrigation water
compared with those farmers whose landholdings are served by canals with a temporary source of
water. The construction and governance of irrigation canals should therefore consider the water
availability at source, particularly during the autumn and spring.
Nepalese society is still patriarchal: men are traditionally seen as the family bread-winners,
while women are home-makers and nurturers (Narayan, Chambers, Shah, & Petesch, 2000) with
little time for participating in village meetings (Thapa, 2001). This gender disparity has serious
implications for power distribution, knowledge dissemination, environmental governance and
access to resources for women. About 40% of female-headed households reported involvement in
the WUA compared with just 9.2% of women from male-headed households (Chi-
square = 23.960, d.f. = 1, p < 0.01). Women’s absence from WUA decision-making means
they have little contribution to make to the development of distributional rules (Agarwal, 1997).
Individuals with a higher level of education have exit options (services and business), better
earning opportunities outside farming, and may find farming activities less attractive, as only
11.5% of respondents with a lower level of education reported to have an exit option compared
with 43.9% of more highly educated respondents (Chi-square = 25.374, d.f. = 1, p < 0.05).
This finding is similar to that of Gunatilake (1998), who observes that the education of the
family members is negatively related to income from local commons in biosphere reserves in
Sri Lanka. Higher educational levels may also be associated with greater opportunity costs for
labour (Yanggen & Reardon, 2001).
CONCLUSIONS
Irrigation infrastructure contributes to the local economy and household food security, but
allocation of water is often unequal. The main findings of this research are that access to
irrigation water is related to both a households’ socio-economic characteristics (such as resource
endowment, caste, gender, level of trust and location) and the characteristics of the irrigation
resources themselves. The existence of heterogeneities has created complex forms of inequality
that are structurally reinforced by distribution of water from the canal systems. Tail-enders are
consistently marginalized when accessing irrigation water, yet they bear disproportionate O&M
costs. In contrast, head-enders have a natural advantage for water extraction and they continue
to over-appropriate water and use it unproductively at the expense of the tail-enders.
The natural locational advantages enjoyed by the farmers at the head end of the canal have
differential economic outcomes. The price of landholdings with good irrigation facilities at the
head end is higher than landholdings at the tail end with less access to irrigation water; while
tail-end farmers incur greater O&M costs than middle- and head-end farmers. Lower-caste
households have a lower level of access to irrigation water than higher-caste groups due to the
pattern and location of land distribution among the different castes. Previous studies have also
attributed inequality in Nepal to the culture of discrimination against those from lower castes,
ethnicities and rural areas (Blaikie, Cameron, & Seddon, 2001). Generally, farmers belonging
to Dalit castes have marginal lands that are often located in unproductive areas called khoriya.
Equally important, Dalit households’ more limited access to water could reflect their low
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degree of influence in decision-making processes and lack of productive resources (Adhikari,
Di Falco, & Lovett, 2004). In addition to differences in land endowment, water-appropriation
inequalities between Dalits and non-Dalits also reflects household needs, as Dalits usually
engage in traditional non-agricultural occupations alongside subsistence agriculture. More
importantly, higher transaction costs for Dalits and lower levels of access to, and control
over, natural resources also reflect inherent village socio-political dynamics in which Dalit
castes are marginalized. Similar conclusions were drawn by Adhikari et al. (2004) in their
study of forest resources in Nepal. There are persistent caste, gender and socio-economic
status obstacles to increasing participation of marginalized groups in decision-making pro-
cesses. For example, women do not usually have land in their name and their concerns related
to irrigation and landholding need to be passed through men; and caste-based discrimination
such as untouchability against the Dalit households has contributed to their socio-political
exclusion.
This research highlights the importance of social capital for enhancing collective action for
managing irrigation resources. The regression results suggest that communities with a high
level of trust tend to have good access to water, and vice versa. Trust and understanding are
critical factors for collective action to reduce defrauding, which has major implications for the
maintenance of an unconstrained flow of water in the canal. The absence of trust creates
conflicts in the maintenance of field channels and control structures, which in turn makes
water delivery unreliable, inadequate and inequitable. In these circumstances, water theft is
common, perhaps leading farmers to report weak access (Uphoff & Wijayaratna, 2000).
Unreliable and inequitable access to water can cause resentment amongst irrigators, and
those who do not obtain their fair share lose confidence in collective action and, hence, report
a low level of trust. The level of trust among the irrigators is positively associated with
collective action which is necessary for canal O&M (Seabright, 1993). Whilst this finding is
consistent with earlier studies (Ostrom, 1990), it is indicative rather than definitive in
identifying causality in the relationship between social capital and access to irrigation
(Baland & Platteau, 1999). There are many enduring and successful FMIS with strong social
aspects, while infrastructure-focused AMIS have failed to achieve their targets (Hilton, 1992;
Meinzen-Dick, 2014).
In order to understand the distributional implications of irrigation enterprises, it is
necessary to understand the socio-economic characteristics of the users as well resource-
specific characteristics. The inequitable distribution of benefits from, and contributions
towards, the O&M of irrigation canals across households with heterogeneous characteristics
provides further evidence of inequity in irrigation management in Nepal. These outcomes can
be viewed a reflection of the better negotiating capabilities of large landholders, often at the
expense of marginal farmers (Chambers, 1977). Asymmetrical information, insufficient
knowledge, low participation along with unequal power distributions result in inequitable
benefit appropriation of the local commons. As a result, they constitute a disincentive for
collective action and may lead to the degradation of the natural resource base.
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